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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCnON
Throughout the problem solving and reasoning literatures
many claims have been made about the types of rules people use
to solve everyday problems. One major question asked is whether
people use abstract domain-independent rules or concrete domain-
specific empirical rules in reasoning. Many scholars, beginning
with Plato, have believed that people rely on abstract rules in
reasoning and problem solving in many different domains. This
theory, known as the formal discipline, proposes that people can
learn abstract rules through education in subjects such as Latin,
logic, and mathematics and apply them to concrete everyday
domains.
Piaget has been an influential modern proponent of this
formalist view, suggesting that throughout cognitive development
abstract rules and schemas are acquired which may be used to
solve general problems in the future. One major difference,
however, is that Piaget believed that abstract thinking is acquired
through cognitive development, not through direct education.
However, since Piaget's theory was proposed, others have found
that children do not progress through stages in the orderly manner
he suggested. They do not always perform similarly on tasks that
represent the same stage of cognitive development. This suggests
that reasoning does not occur solely on an abstract level,
rather
1
children's reasoning is based on specific rules that they have
learned.
Others, beginning primarily with Thorndike, (1906;
Thomdike & Woodworth 1901) have also suggested that people do
not possess such abstract rules. On the contrary, people possess
rules that are used only in the specific domains in which they were
learned. These rules are used to deal with concrete events.
Thomdike' s research led him to believe that the transfer of
learning was entirely dependent on the occurrence of identical
elements in the training and testing situations.
More recently, Wason's work (1966) has also been important
in supporting this empirical notion. Wason's selection task
requires subjects to determine what information is necessary to
confirm or reject a rule. The rule his subjects were given was "If a
card has an A on one side, then it has a 4 on the other." The
subjects were then shown four cards on which was written either
an A, a B, a 4 or a 7. They were then asked to turn over the two
cards which would confirm this rule. The correct answer would
require subjects to turn over the A and the 7. Wason found that
people made many errors when attempting to reason abstractly
about these arbitrary symbols and tended to give the answers A
and 4. However, in subsequent research he found that when
people were given similar problems in more familiar and concrete
domains so that the task made sense based on the content of the
problem, they were able to solve selection task problems with
little trouble (Evans 1982; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Sonino-
Legrenzi 1972; Wason & Johnson-Laird 1972). Such research has
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led many to support the empirical view of reasoning. That is,
while people may form rules, the rules they form are not abstract
rules that are easily applied across domains. Rather, they are
domain-specific rules based on specific experiences (Griggs & Cox
1982; Reich & Ruth 1982).
Not only are the types of rules people use to solve everyday
problems of interest, it is also important to ascertain whether or
not people easily abstract and use these rules. Pedagogically, it is
important to know whether these rules may be taught, and how
this is best done. Subsequently it is important to learn how
readily the rules are then used in various domains.
Strong transfer effects have been difficult to demonstrate in
the problem-solving literature (Gick & Holyoak 1980, 1983;
Singley & Anderson 1989). For example, Gick and Holyoak (1980,
1983) gave subjects a story to read about a military problem in
which a general wants to capture an enemy fortress. The fortress,
located at the center of several incoming roads, is difficult to attack
because any large group on any road leading into the fortress will
cause mines to explode. The general is therefore required to send
his troops in small groups up each road. After reading this
problem and answer, the subjects were then asked to solve
Duncker's radiation problem (1945). In this problem a doctor
needs to perform surgery on a tumor through the use of rays that
can destroy human tissue if they are of sufficient intensity. The
doctor can not send in enough rays to destroy the tumor at one
place or else other tissues will be destroyed. Only 20% more
subjects were able to solve this problem after receiving the
military example than those subjects who received no analogous
example.
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) reported similar results about the
effects of training on transfer of logical rules. They found that an
entire course in formal logic did students little good in avoiding
errors when they were asked to solve conditional selection
problems such as Wason's selection task. However, when subjects
were given more familiar concrete problems such as, "If a person
is drinking alcohol, then he/she must be over 21", they were able
to identify the correct options for checking this rule when given
the following four options: someone drinking a soft drink,
someone drinking alcohol, someone over 21, someone under 21.
Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver (1986) reasoned that the formal
logic training was ineffective because in reasoning people use
practical permission schemas, not formal rules. These pragmatic
schemas are generalized sets of rules which are defined in relation
to classes of goals and the relationships to those goals. These
schemas therefore allow people to reason correctly about the
situations for which they hold these schemas, but do not allow
them to transfer this ability. This theory is somewhat different
than both the empirical and formalist viewpoints. It suggests that
although people do not use abstract rules, they also do not merely
possess concrete domain-specific rules. Rather they possess
pragmatic structures which can be used in several situations.
The effects of training have been investigated in several
areas other than logical reasoning. One important area is that of
statistical reasoning. Tversky and Kahneman conducted research
investigating how people reason statistically in everyday situations
(1971, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky 1972). They found that instead
of using normative statistical rules, subjects used heuristics such as
"representativeness", "availability", and "anchoring and
adjustment". Additionally, they also first noted people's disregard
for sample size when solving probabilistic problems. They
concluded that through the use of the representativeness heuristic
people make probabilistic judgments with no regard for sample
size.
Understanding the effects of sample size is extremely
important in understanding statistics, thus, there have been a
number of investigations of how training affects peoples'
understanding of the law of large numbers. The law of large
numbers (LLN) states that as a sample's size increases, the
statistics of the sample become less variable and therefore become
a better estimate of the corresponding population's parameters.
Fong and Nisbett (Fong, Krantz & Nisbett, 1986; Fong &
Nisbett 1991) have conducted several studies dealing with the
training of the LLN, which they have argued support the formalist
theory of reasoning. Fong et al. (1986) concluded that training had
positive effects on students' abilities to solve problems in which
the LLN is applicable. In several studies Fong and Nisbett (Fong et
al. 1986; Fong & Nisbett 1991) found that brief training sessions
on the LLN led to significant improvement rates on future LLN
problems.
In the 1986 study, Fong et al. tested four types of training.
These included a demand condition, an abstract training condition.
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a guided induction condition, and a full training condition. In the
"demand" condition subjects were given a one-sentence definition
of the LLN and one example problem. The abstract training
condition involved a brief written explanation of the LLN followed
by a verbal presentation. This presentation included explaining
the LLN by drawing various samples from a population of red and
blue gumballs in an urn. The guided induction consisted of a
paragraph that introduced the LLN, followed by several example
problems. Following the problems were explanations of how to use
the LLN in those problems. The full training condition consisted of
both the abstract and guided induction training methods. These
four training groups were compared to a control group that
received no training.
Following the training, students were asked to solve several
problems that represented various structures and domains within
the LLN. The problems were divided into three content domains.
The first, "probabilistic", consisted of problems in which an
element of randomness was made obvious. For example, a random
generating device was included, or the sample was said to be
random. The "objective" problems required subjects to make
judgments about objective data. For these problems, data were
generally included about two different situations, and subjects
were asked to make a judgment based on that data. The last
domain, "subjective", consisted of problems that contained
subjective data about which the subjects were asked to make
judgments. For example, one problem described a situation in
which a student needed to decide to attend one of two schools.
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based on a large amount of information from friends, or his own
small sample of first impressions of the schools.
Each domain included six different problem structures. In
the first, subjects were required to draw conclusions about a
population from one small sample. The second structure required
a comparison between a small sample and a large sample. In the
third, subjects were required to explain why an outcome with
extreme deviation was not maintained in later samples. Structure
four is said to be like structure two, the difference being that the
large sample was drawn from a population related, but not
identical to the target population. With the fifth structure, subjects
were required to compare a large sample to a theory that was not
actually founded in the data. That is, the theory sounded
reasonable, but no evidence was presented to support it. The last
structure was for the false alarm problems. In these, conclusions
were made from a large, but highly biased sample. An answer was
considered to be a false alarm if the subject indicated that a larger
sample was needed to make a conclusion. Thus, these problems
were aimed to detect any overgeneralization of the LLN. The
examples in the guided induction training were from the objective
problems domain.
Based on a three-point coding system, in which an answer
was given a score of 1 if it was deterministic, a 2 if it was a poor
statistical answer and a 3 if it was a good statistical answer, Fong
et al. (1986) found that students who received the complete
training were able to produce 22% more statistical answers (scores
of 2 and 3) than control groups averaged across the above problem
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domains (42% vs. 64%). The percentage of statistical answers of
high quality (the proportion of scores of 3 out of all of the
statistical answers, 2s and 3s) was also higher after training
(control 54% vs. full training 70%). Students with either the rule
training or example training alone also did better than the control
group. Their responses included 56% and 54% statistical answers,
respectively, with 67% and 66% respectively of these answers
considered to be of high quality. They concluded that these results
supported the formalist theory of reasoning because subjects were
able to use an abstract concept more frequently after having
received either abstract training or examples training alone.
In their 1991 study, Fong and Nisbett were primarily
interested in determining whether subjects were using domain-
independent rules to solve problems or were solving problems by
analogy from example problems. In their first experiment, they
trained subjects on the LLN, using example problems from either
the domain of sports or of ability testing. They then tested their
subjects with problems from both domains either immediately or
after a two-week delay. They found that when subjects were
tested immediately, there was no interaction effect between
training and testing domains. However, a significant interaction
between training and testing domains was found after the two-
week delay. In two of the experiments subjects were given a
questionnaire, which probed subjects' memories for the problems
and training they had received in the first testing session, at the
end of testing sessions. Because no subjects were able to recall
many details about any of the problems they received during the
first testing session, Fong and Nisbett interpreted the delayed
testing interaction as indicating that subjects' memories for the
abstract rules were sparked by familiar problems,
Fong and Nisbett (1991; Fong et al. 1986) have relied on the
formalist point of view to explain their results. They argue that
people do in fact have abstract inferential rules which they use to
solve everyday problems, and that abstract training manipulates
these rules. The main results they provide to support this theory
are as follows:
1) The abstract rule training alone led to improvements in
both the frequency and quality of statistical answers (from
42 to 56 percent and 54 to 67 percent).
2) Abstract rule training was effective across problem
structure domains.
3) Examples training (guided induction) generalized across
domains (probabilistic and subjective) that were not
included in training (Nisbett, Fong, Lehman & Cheng, 1987).
Thus, they conclude that with training in one domain the problems
in several domains became easier for subjects to solve correctly.
Before commenting on the conclusions found in the Fong et al.
papers, it is important to note other research that has been
conducted in this area.
Well, PoUatsek and Boyce (1990) have also conducted
training studies on the LLN. One type of training used in their
study involved computer supplemented sessions in which
sampling distributions were explained to subjects. The subjects
were then led to create their own sampling distributions. Like
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Fong et al. (1986), Well et al. (1990) also found that training had
significant effects on the subjects' abilities to solve problems.
However, Well et al. (1990) also found that after training, subjects
still did not understand the effects of sample size on the variability
of the sample average. After training subjects were asked to
predict how increasing the sample sizes in sampling distributions
from 10 to 100 would affect the variability in the sampling
distribution of the means. Subjects could not correctly predict that
larger samples would decrease the variability. Thus, they
concluded that although students' performance on problems
dealing with the LLN improved with training on sampling
distributions, the students still did not fully understand the LLN.
Some of the differences found between the Fong et al. (1986)
and Fong and Nisbett (1991) conclusions and those of other
studies, such as the Well et al. (1990) research, lead to many
questions for teachers of statistics and scientists studying the
learning of statistical concepts. Some of the important issues about
the above mentioned studies that should be examined carefully,
and which will be discussed here are: the coding systems used to
evaluate performance; the testing materials; the important results;
and the conclusions that should be drawn from the results.
The coding system in the Fong et al. work (1986; Fong &
Nisbett 1991) has repeatedly been based on a three-point scoring
system. According to this system, the subjects received one point
for giving an answer that made no use of any statistical concept,
that is, an entirely deterministic response. A 2 was given for "poor
statistical responses". That is, if subjects mentioned any statistical
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idea, even if it was wrong, they received two points. Tliis score
was also given to those who mentioned the LLN (which was in the
instructions) but did not give an explicit answer. A 3 was given
for a "good statistical response". Correct use of a statistical
response yielded this score. Fong and Nisbett (1991) state that
training not only led to a greater quantity of statistical answers
(scores of 2 and 3), it also led to higher quality statistical answers
(that is, more 3s). This argument does not follow from the data.
The control group's mean was 1.5. Immediately after training, the
mean score for test questions from the same training domain was
approximately 1.85; 1.90 for sports, and 1.83 for ability testing
problems. This mdicates that most students did not, in fact,
receive mostly twos and threes. As Ploger' and Wilson (1991) have
recently pointed out, these numbers indicate that the majority of
students, regardless of training condition, are not providing good
statistical reasons. In fact the scores obtained by Fong and Nisbett
could have occurred if students had simply been repeating
something like, "The Law of Large Numbers applies here" in their
answers. Ploger and Wilson (1991) also suggested that this could
be true, pointing out that while a quarter or less of the subjects in
the Fong and Nisbett (1991) study correctly applied the LLN, more
than three quarters were able to recall the law well enough to
receive the highest score possible in the quality coding system.
One interesting difference between another recent Well et al.
(1992) LLN training study and the similar Fong et al. (1986) study
is that the training group in the Well et al. study did an average of
52% better in immediate testing and 57% better in delayed testing
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than the control group. This is much greater than the 22%
frequency difference in the Fong et al. 1986 study. If with a larger
improvement rate Well et al. found that the students still did not
have an adequate understanding of the LLN, it does not seem
possible that the trained subjects in the Fong et al. study (1986)
could have had an adequate understanding. Another important
difference is that the control group in the Fong et al. study (1986)
correctly answered 42% of the questions, with 52% giving "quality"
answers. In Well et al. (1990) only 23% of the control group gave
correct answers. It is important to look at the differences in
testing materials given such varying results.
Beyond the differences in results, it is important to note the
differences in training. The Fong et al. (1986) and Fong and
Nisbett (1991) abstract rule training included several one-sentence
descriptions of the LLN in terms such as, "the larger the sample,
the better it is in estimating the population", "the larger the sample
is that you draw, the better that sample is in estimating the
population", etc. The Well et al. (1990) training included some
instruction on how sample size affects variability and also
attempted to explain how statistics taken from samples produce
sampling distributions. The increased variability of the
distributions of sample means when the samples are small as
compared to when they are large was also addressed directly.
Although the more complex training may have only confused
subjects about the issue of variability, it must have at the very
least made them aware of the issue. The Fong et al. (1986) and
Fong and Nisbett (1991) instructions mentioned bigger deviations
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with small samples, but did not address the issue of variability in
much detail. With such training one may not understand the
importance of variability in the LLN. The Fong et al. (1986)
subjects were able to reproduce the fact that the larger samples
are able to better estimate the population than small samples are.
This is an important fact, but being able to reproduce it is not an
indication of having an accurate abstract rule for the LLN.
An adequate understanding of the LLN needs to include
several concepts. These concepts include understanding the
differences between population, sample, and sampling
distributions, especially in terms of the effects of different sample
sizes on sampling distributions. Additionally, students should
understand why big samples can be used to make estimates about
population parameters, and why they are better than small
samples in terms of the variability of the samples' statistics.
Another important idea that students should have at least a basic
understanding of is regression toward the mean. Finally, in order
to have an adequate understanding of the LLN, it is essential to
understand why random samples are necessary, in terms of
efficiency and accuracy.
An important issue to consider in describing adequate
learning of the LLN, is the distinction made by the Gestalt
psychologists between senseless and meaningful learning (Katona,
1940). They referred to senseless learning as the kind studied by
the associationists, that is, merely learning by memorizing.
Meaningful learning occurs through a deep understanding of the
underlying structure in problems. They claimed that meaningful
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learning would encourage transfer much more frequently than
senseless learning. Perhaps the difference in the results of the
Fong et al. (1986) and Well et al. (1990) studies lies in this issue.
That is, while in the Fong et al. (1986) study subjects showed
improvement with training, senseless learning may have been all
that occurred. While it is doubtful that the subjects in the Well et
al. (1990) study truly had a deep understanding of the underlying
structure of the LLN problems, perhaps these subjects experienced
the beginning stages of more meaningful learning.
In continuing research Well et al. (1992) have also tested
understanding the LLN by using problems in which the LLN is not
applicable, but with a limited amount of understanding, might
appear to be. These so called "lure" problems were intended to
serve the same kind of purpose as the Fong et al. (1986; Fong &
Nisbett 1991) false alarms. An example of a lure problem, the fish
hatchery problem follows:
"The manager of a fish hatchery monitors data about the
length and weight of trout that are raised in the hatchery tanks.
This information is important because it has been found that if the
trout are too small when they are released into rivers and lakes,
the survival rate will be low. Since there are thousands of trout in
the tanks, the data are obtained by taking random samples of the
trout in each tank. From past data, they know the average weight
of trout at a certain age is one pound. On a given day, two
employees each take a random sample of trout at that age to
measure. However, one takes a sample of 10 and the other takes a
sample of 50. They weigh each trout in the sample and compute
the percent of trout that are less than 3/4 of a pound.
Which would be true?
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(1) The percent of trout less than 3/4 pound should be greater in
the small sample than in the large sample.
(2) The percent of trout less than 3/4 pound should be greater in
the large sample than in the small sample.
(3) There is no reason to expect that the percent of trout less than
3/4 pound would be greater in one sample than in the other.
Please write down the reasons that you selected the answer vou
did. "
^
Superficially, the above problem looks like a sampling distribution
problem; however it is, in fact, asking about the distribution of
scores within samples. Therefore, a subject who was applying a
"bigger is better" heuristic without much understanding might
select answer (1), instead of the correct answer (3). Well et al.
(1992) found that subjects who received some training were much
more likely than subjects that received no training to make errors
on lure problems. (On the above problem, the control group made
0% errors, the trained group made 92% errors.) Most no-training
subjects were able to answer these lures correctly, but were not
able to answer the test questions correctly. This supports neither
an empirical nor a formalist view. The former view suggests
students would learn a domain-specific rule which was not
transferrable across domains. The latter suggests students would
learn the abstract rule and correctly apply it only where it was
applicable. However, what occurred in this study is that the
subjects abstracted part of the rule and then attempted to apply it
in most of the problems.
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Perhaps when people do form abstract rules, they simply do
not know how to apply them. Kahneman and Tversky have
distinguished between errors of comprehension and errors of
application (1982). Errors of comprehension occur because people
do not correctly understand a rule. Errors of application occur
when people know a rule, but do not know how to correctly apply
it to certain problems. Although it is possible the students
originally made errors of comprehension, after training they seem
to have also made errors of application. Perhaps students do not
simply fall into one of these two categories. Rather, they may
make errors of both types because they possess only a partial
understanding of the concept.
Several possibilities have been mentioned about how people
understand the LLN and other similar statistical concepts. The LLN
is a concept that everyone encounters at some point in their lives
in practical everyday situations, whether they are aware of it or
not (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda 1983). Some everyday
examples include trying to understand how the information gained
from a poll estimates information about a population. Other
examples may arise through participation in sports. This can come
through experience with outliers or regression to the mean
situations, such as a champion team losing, a home run hitter
striking out, a poor batter getting a hit, or a specific player's
average regressing to the mean. Apart from sports, the concept
may be encountered in many other ways. For instance, gardeners
realize that a very small sample from one's garden may not be
indicative of the quality of all of the plants in that garden, and
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certainly not indicative of the quality of all of the gardens in a
town that year. Students may realize that if they only ask three
classmates how they did on an exam, they may not get an accurate
indication of the class's average or distribution of overall
performance. Therefore, as Fong et al. (1986) and Fong and
Nisbett (1991) have suggested, subjects may in fact have a general
concept of the LLN that can be made more clear through training.
It is also possible that while people do have some understanding of
the concept, they do not have an in-depth understanding that they
easily apply across domains. Based on what was found in the Well
et al. (1990, 1992) studies, it can be seen that an in-depth
understanding is not something that is quickly taught in brief
trammg sessions, and then accurately applied across domains.
Many have suggested that there are several aspects involved
in the concept of the LLN. (e.g., Fong & Nisbett 1991; Holland,
Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard 1986; Kunda & Nisbett 1986; Well et
al. 1990). Although it is simple to teach people that in drawing
samples "bigger is better", it is much more difficult to teach them
what this means in terms of variability, predicting from
populations to samples, standard deviations, etc. Fong et al. (1986)
employed several structures which touched on different
approaches to presenting LLN problems; however, the problems
representing all of the structures, other than the false alarms,
could correctly be answered with a superficial understanding of
the LLN. The false alarm problems used in the study did not
actually test the subjects' abilities to decipher when the law is
applicable and when it is not. Rather, they test one's ability to
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acknowledge biased information. An example of a false alarm
problem, the brewery problem follows:
"A brewery buys nearly all of its reusable glass bottles from
a local glass manufacturer. One summer, however, the local
company is unable to deliver enough bottles, and the brewery
orders a shipment from a large glass manufacturer that distributes
Its products nationwide. On the first day that these new bottles
are used, however, the bottle-filling machinery has to be stopped
four times because of jamming, and as a result, production for the
day IS unusually low. (Ordinarily the brewery does not experience
more than one jamming stoppage per day and frequently there are
none at all.) The foreman is worried about the new bottles. He
decides to test the new bottles produced by the national
manufacturer carefully. He randomly selects 300 cases of these
new bottles and instructs the bottle-filler operators to record
carefully each jamming incident. Meanwhile, company mechanics
carefully lubricate and check adjustments on the bottle-filling
machinery. When they are finished, the bottle-filling machinery is
running more smoothly than it has in years. During the next 2
days, the 300 cases of new bottles are fed to the machine. There
are only two jamming incidents, one each day. The foreman
concludes that there is in fact little or no real disadvantage of the
new bottles with respect to jamming of the bottle-filling machine.
What do you think about the foreman's reasoning? Give
reasons for your answers."
Understanding that biased information is not good information is
an important aspect of understanding the LLN, however, it is not
exactly a difficult or counterintuitive notion. People will quickly
assert that biased information is not worthwhile. If subjects had
been given slightly more stringent false alarm problems in their
study, their false alarm error rates might have been higher. They
do not provide a test for overgeneralization on topics closely
related to the LLN, as the lure problems in the Well et al. studies
did (1992). It seems rather feasible that some subjects may have
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slipped through the false alarms. That is, they may have answered
these questions as they would have before training. They could
have gotten these questions correct without understanding why.
Therefore, I do not think that the Fong et al. (1986) and Fong and
Nisbett (1991) studies adequately tested for understanding of the
LLN. Thus, subjects may in fact have an abstract rule which they
apply across domains, but the rule may not be correct or may be
only partially adequate. Subjects may attempt to apply this rule
across domains when the problems are not obviously unrelated to
the rule.
I am also not convinced that Fong et al. (1986) and Fong and
Nisbett (1991) have provided strong evidence that training is
naturally and easily applied across domains. The instructions in
their studies told the subjects that the LLN may be helpful in
solving some of the problems given to them. Subjects with little
understanding of the LLN could easily try to recall a basic
statement from the training, and with a simple "bigger is better"
do quite well on all of the problems. The Fong et al. (1986)
training materials for the abstract rule condition contain seven
statements defining the LLN (See Appendix A). All of these
statements are variations of the statement "the larger the sample,
the better it is in estimating the population". Using those materials
is a good way to be sure that the students realize the importance
of the LLN and remember a simple definition of it. However,
remembering this simplistic definition is not necessarily indicative
of actually understanding of the law.
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Fong and Nisbett (1991) concluded that after a two week
delay, subjects did not perform as well in their untrained domains
as in their trained domains because their memory for the rule they
learned in training was sparked by problems similar to those they
received in training. Fong and Nisbett also stated that their results
were not due to subjects' memories for specific examples. Fong
and Nisbett (1991) support this conclusion by suggesting that the
students did not know the two sessions were related. It is not
implausible that the thought did not occur to the subjects. When
the subjects returned they were not given further training;
however, as before, the questions they were given included the
instructions, "In many of the problems you may find the law of
large numbers is helpful." Upon reading that, subjects may have
grasped for any idea they could remember, such as the simple rule
that big samples are better than small ones. This is enough of an
understanding to receive at least two of the three possible points
in the Fong and Nisbett (1991) scoring system. Although this can
be considered an abstract rule, it is only one component of the
LLN. The fact that subjects may be able to remember it does not
warrant saying that they retained a good understanding of the
LLN.
Thus, while previous research on peoples' understanding of
the LLN has been important and informative, it has left us with
many questions still to answer. Some of the important questions
which still need to be studied include the following: Can statistical
concepts such as the LLN be quickly taught in the form of accurate
abstract rules that are easily and appropriately applied across
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domains? Do people easily learn heuristics and overapply them
without fully understanding what the statistical concepts mean?
What aspects of the LLN are being taught in brief training sessions
and are easily learned? What is missing? Is there a way in which
subjects can be taught some things in a brief session that would
lead them to use the LLN when appropriate, but also to understand
that sometimes it is not appropriate and why? It is important for
researchers interested in learning, especially in the learning of
statistical concepts, to address these questions in their research.
In the present paper some of these issues have been addressed
through studying the effects of several types of training on
students' understandings of the LLN.
21
CHAPTER n
EXPERIMENT
Purpose
The present study was conducted in order to establish a
more adequate test of what subjects learn from various types of
training than had been previously provided. In order to establish
whether training was as successful as was previously claimed by
Pong and Nisbett(1991, Pong et al., 1986), the present study
includes some training conditions similar to those used in the Pong
and Nisbett research, along with test questions from these and
other studies. A training method similar to one used in Well et al.
research (1990) was also tested in order to ascertain whether
subjects who received this type of training were better able to
understand different aspects of the LLN than were subjects who
received another type of training, such as that from the Pong and
Nisbett research.
The present study attempts to discover what subjects
understand about the LLN beyond simply being able to recall it.
This includes attempting to look at what subjects understand about
the role of accuracy and variability in the LLN after brief training
sessions by investigating the kinds of rationales which subjects
give for their answers. Additionally, developing a more adequate
coding system than that used by Pong and Nisbett was thought to
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be imperative in order to ascertain whether subjects can
adequately apply the LLN. As Ploger and Wilson (1991) have
suggested, it seems that although the Fong and Nisbett subjects
(1991) were better able to remember the LLN after training, they
were still not able to consistently apply the rule. Therefore, the
intentions for the present study were to provide questions that
would encourage subjects to directly deal with various statistical
concepts related to the LLN, such as accuracy or variability, and to
determine if they would consistently apply the LLN.
The purpose was to see if students can transfer a learned
rule across domains and apply it to several types of everyday
statistical problems, as the formalist theory would suggest. In
order to give subjects the chance to do this' on their own, the
instructions did not indicate that the LLN would be helpful in
answering the problems.
My prediction was that in this training study the formalist
theory would not be strongly supported. I expected that when
subjects were given LLN problems to solve after training, they
would attempt to transfer some knowledge about the LLN to
various types of problems. However, they would attempt to
transfer a basic rule, such as bigger is better, without fully
understanding the LLN. Additionally, they would attempt to
transfer this rule where it is not applicable, thus indicating that
they did not understand the implications of the LLN.
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Materials
Training Materials
Four training conditions were included in the study. (All of
the training materials are listed in Appendix A.) The training
conditions were as follows:
(1) Minimal training condition;
(2) Rule repeated condition;
(3) Expanded explanation condition;
(4) Full training condition.
Because it has been shown that some training is better than
no training (Fong et al. 1986; Well et al. 1990), the training
conditions were not tested against a no training condition. Rather,
a "minimum training" condition was included in order to ascertain
whether subjects merely learn the statement, "bigger samples are
more accurate" from training. If the subjects in this group did not
do significantly worse than the subjects in any of the other
training conditions, this would suggest that the subjects in all
conditions might be only remembering this most basic statement
and have only an extremely superficial understanding of the LLN.
The demand condition in the Fong et al. (1986) study in which
subjects read a one-sentence introduction to the LLN followed by
an example might be thought to be similar to the minimum
training condition in the present study. However, it is difficult to
ascertain exactly what the subjects read in the Fong et al. (1986)
study. Subjects in the Fong et al. demand condition reportedly
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produced higher quality answers that were classified as being
statistical more frequently than subjects in the control group.
Although the improvements were not significant, it was deemed
worthwhile to test this type of condition again.
In the training materials used by Fong et al. (1986) and Fong
and Nisbett (1991), simplistic definitions of the LLN were repeated
several times. For example, in the rule training condition in the
former study, a definition of LLN was given seven times. It is
possible that subjects simply memorized a definition of the LLN
without really abstracting the concept. Therefore, in the second
condition used (rule repeated), subjects received a written
explanation of the rule. In this short statement the LLN was
repeatedly defined in terms taken from the Fong et al. (1986) rule
training condition. A statement indicatmg that the LLN is
important when drawing samples was also included. If subjects
reading this statement were able to do as well as the subjects in
the other two training conditions, their performance may indicate
that subjects do not understand and abstract the rule in a manner
that enables them to apply it across domains. Rather, they are
able to repeat what they have been told is important without
understanding the concept.
The third training condition is similar to a condition used by
Well et al. (1992) in recent research. In one study a written
explanation condition was included in order to determine whether
it was as helpful as a full training condition. Although students did
better on problems after receiving this explanation than they did
with no training, (38% correct vs. 23% correct in immediate
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testing) they did not do nearly as well as they did in the full
training condition (75% correct in immediate testing). One
confounding variable Well et al. later discovered was that in the
full training condition subjects received a LLN problem (the post
office problem, Appendix A) before the training. In the written
explanation condition subjects did not receive this problem.
Because subjects may have been more interested in the training
after receiving a problem, Well et al. decided to test a condition in
which the same LLN problem was given to subjects before they
received the written explanation. The results indicate that
presenting this problem did in fact improve performance on
subsequent problems (58% correct vs 35% correct in the written
explanation condition).
Therefore, the expanded explanation condition was included
in this study in order to obtain some knowledge about what
subjects learned in this condition. It is possible that they did
abstract an understanding of the LLN after being primed by a
problem where the rule was applicable. It is important to know
whether subjects learn as much about the LLN in this condition as
subjects in the Fong et al. (1986) full training condition, or as much
as subjects in the rule repeating condition. Subjects in the Fong et
al. (1986) full training condition received example problems after
receiving the written and verbal explanations of the LLN. It is
pedagogically important to ascertain whether making subjects
aware of the applicability of a rule by introducing a problem
before training encourages students' learning more than explaining
examples after training.
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The last training condition was nearly identical to the Fong et
al. (1986) full training condition. The rule training and the guided
induction training that comprise this condition were taken from
the Fong et al. (1986) materials. There were only two differences
between Fong et al.'s (1986) full training and the full training
condition in this study. The first is that black and white marbles
were used in this study instead of red and blue gumballs. The
second difference is that only two examples were explained
instead of three. This change was made due to time constraints.
If after training in this condition subjects are not only able to
give correct answers more frequently, but also to provide more
sophisticated rationales than subjects in the other conditions, the
full training can be considered unique and valuable.
In summary, the purpose of all of the above conditions was
to ascertain whether subjects were able to abstract the LLN and
apply it across several problem types without being directly told
to do so in any of the conditions. Additionally, if they were able to,
which training conditions lead to this, and what did subjects
abstract?
Testing Materials
The different aspects of the LLN that were to be studied in
each of the problems were variability and accuracy. In order to
leam the most about what subjects understand, several kinds of
problems were used including some open-ended problems from
Fong et al.'s study (1986) as well as some multiple choice problems
used by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) and Well et al. (1990). All
of the problems are listed in Appendix B. In the immediate testing
condition subjects received eight problems that deah with some
aspect of the LLN and one filler problem.
The eight problems included two open ended problems
(taken from Fong et al. 1986), two lure problems, one false alarm
(taken from Fong et al. 1986), one center version problem and two
tail version problems. The center version and tail version
problems were described and used by Well et al. (1990). Center
version problems were stated in terms of the center of a sampling
distribution whereas tail version problems were stated in terms of
the tails of a sampling distribution.
The purpose behind selecting these eight problems was to
present subjects with a variety of problems' which allowed them to
give answers that rely on the concepts of accuracy and/or
variability, while also allowing them to show that they would not
overapply the LLN where it was not applicable. The variety of
problems also allowed for a comparison between subjects from
each training condition on different types of problems. The false
alarms and lures were intended to test the students' knowledge
about an aspect of the LLN that does not simply follow the "bigger
is better" rule. Two lures were included and only one false alarm
because the lures provide a more stringent test for understanding
the LLN than the false alarms do. These three problems combined
with the filler made up half of the problems subjects were given in
the first testing session. This ensured that subjects were given
ample opportunity to realize that the LLN may not apply to all
problems.
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Also, Well et al. (1990) found that subjects were significantly
better able to correctly answer center version problems than tail
version problems. They suggested that this was due to the fact
that while subjects may understand the increased accuracy of a
larger sample's mean, they frequently still did not understand the
the effects of sample size on variability. Therefore, because they
more directly lend themselves to explanations based on the idea of
variability than do the center version or Fong et al. (1986)
problems, two tail version problems were included.
Because no training time was required in the second session,
more time was available for problems, therefore two additional
problems (another center version problem and another open
ended problem) were included. The additional open ended
problem was intended to act as another false alarm, however the
problems selected were later determined to be extremely different
from the false alarms and were therefore thrown out. The
problems used were counterbalanced within groups across testing
sessions.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were recruited from the University of
Massachusetts Department of Psychology subject pool. They
consisted of 48 undergraduates who received class credit for their
participation. None of the subjects had previously taken a college
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statistics course. The subjects were divided into training groups of
1-4 students.
Procedure
Within each small trainmg group all subjects received the
same training materials. The subjects were given the training
materials to read at the beginning of the session. When the
subjects were finished with the training materials, the testing
problems were administered. Originally these were going to be
given one-by-one to the entire group (that is, a problem would be
passed out to all subjects only when the previous one had been
completed by all of the subjects) in order to encourage the subjects
to take the time to write an explanation down, rather than racing
through the problems. However, there was an extremely large
amount of variability in the speed at which the subjects worked.
Therefore, each subject was given all of his/her problems at one
time and was given the following instructions,
"I am going to be giving you several problems to solve. I
would like for you to give each problem your best answer.
However, I do not want you to be worried if you are not
sure about which is the correct answer. Give me your
best answer. I am more interested in why you gave the
answer that you gave for each question than whether or
not you get the correct answer. Therefore, after each
question you will be asked to give your rationale for the
answer, or to explain what you think about the
rationale given in the problem. Please take your time to
do your best at explaining your reasoning, even if you are
not sure the answer is correct. Please take your time to
do this. You will have plenty of time to finish. I would
like you to do one problem at a time. Do them in the
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order in which they have been given to you. After you
finish one please turn it over and continue with the next
problem. Do not worry about going back to any questions.
If you have any questions at any time, please feel free to
me. Remember to take your time, you have plenty of
time."
The subjects in the control group were given the one
sentence definition (see Appendix A), the above instructions and
then the problems. The subjects in the expanded explanation
group were given the post office problem to solve. When the
subjects were finished with the problem they were asked to
carefully read the explanation. After all of the subjects were
finished with the explanation, they were given the above
instructions and the problems were administered. Likewise,
subjects in the rule repeated group were asked to carefully read
their explanation. When all of the subjects were finished reading,
they were given the instructions followed by the problems. The
full training group was initially asked to carefully read the written
abstract explanation. When all subjects were finished reading, the
brief oral presentation of the LLN was given. The full training
group was then given the explained examples. Subjects were
asked to carefully read and answer each problem and then to
carefully read the explanation proceeding the problem.
They were
then given the previously mentioned instructions followed
by the
testing problems. The entire session for the full training
group
lasted about an hour. Sessions for each of the
other groups lasted
about 35 to 45 minutes.
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The second testing session occurred approximately two
weeks after the first (mean=14.81 days, standard deviation=1.97).
All subjects received the same instructions as in the first session.
The second session lasted 30 to 40 minutes.
Half of the subjects in each condition received one set of
problems in the first session and the other set of problems in the
second session. The order of problem sets was coumerbalanced
across conditions. The order of the problems remained the same
for all subjects with the starting point in the order randomized.
Analvsis and Results
Three separate coding systems were used to score the
answers and the written rationales for them for each question.
Scoring was based on the following three criteria:
(1) whether or not an answer was correct;
(2) the three-point coding system developed by Fong and
Nisbett (Fong et al. 1986; Fong & Nisbett 1991); and
(3) a qualitative coding of the rationales.
Each of these analyses will first be reported separately, followed
by any appropriate comparisons between analyses.
Analysis of Correctness
Each correct answer was given a score of 1, and each
incorrect answer was given a score of 0, regardless of the rationale
given after the answer. In the multiple choice problems it was
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simple to determine whether subjects chose the correct
alternative. However, the scoring for the open-ended problems
was not so straightforward. The answers for the false alarm
problems were given a score of 1 if there was no indication that a
larger sample was needed. The open-ended test problems were
given a 1 if the subject correctly agreed or disagreed with the
rationale given in the problem. It is important to emphasize that
scoring a problem as correct did not mean that the rationales the
subjects gave for agreeing or disagreeing were necessarily correct.
Six totals were obtained for each subject. These included the
total correct for each of the following groups of questions for each
testing session: (1) Test problems, open-ended problems
(excluding the false alarms), as well as the center and tail version
problems; (2) lures; and (3) false alarms. These totals were not
combined because the problem types were considered to be too
different, and the individual totals were initially of more interest.
If subjects in one training condition were able to correctly answer
all test questions, while subjects in another condition were only
able to answer the lures and false alarms, the results would
indicate a great deal about what subjects learned.
The mean proportions correct and standard errors of the
means for each of the training condition's totals are listed in Table
1. Overall, subjects' performance was quite poor. The across group
averages indicate that subjects correctly answered less than 50% of
the test and lure problems and about 70% of the false alarm
problems. Training group did not have an effect on performance,
in fact the average percent of correct test questions for groups 1, 2,
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Table 1
Average Scores for Problem Types bv Group s fr>r
Each of the Two Test Sessions
Problem Type
Training '^^^^ Lure False Alarm
^roup first second first second first second
Minimum .556 .396 .375 .375 .917 .583
(.075) (.065) (.125) (.125) (.083) (.149)
Rule .500 .438 .500 .250 .750 .667
Repeating (.112) (.070) (.087) (.115) (.131) (.142)
Expanded .472 .521 .500 .625 .667 .667
Explan. (.104) (.104) (.138) (.125) (.142) (.142)
Full .556 .479 .292 .458 .667 .583
(.063) (.084) (.114) (.130) (.142) (.149)
Average .521 .458 .417 .427 .750 .625
Note: Mean scores based on 0,1 coding. The standard errors of the
means are listed in parentheses.
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3, and 4 were 48%, 47%, 50% and 52% respectively. Analyses of
variance conducted for group differences with independent
variables question type, and testing time did not reveal any
significant differences between training groups. However, the
mean proportions correct indicate that all subjects performed a
little better on false alarm questions than on test or lure problems.
A more detailed item analysis will be discussed later.
Additionally, no subjects appeared to perform well on any types of
problems. The one exception may be the minimal training group's
and the rule repeated group's performance on the first session
false alarm questions. However, the differences in performance
levels were not significant.
Fong and Nisbett Three-point Scale Analysis
An analysis based on the Fong et al. (1986; Fong & Nisbett
1991) three-point coding scheme was conducted. This was done in
order to ascertain whether or not the present results were actually
in conflict with the Fong et al. results, or merely different because
the scoring system was different. Fong et al. describe this coding
in the following manner:
(1) A one was given for an entirely deterministic answer.
(2) A two was given for a poor statistical answer.
(3) A three was given for a good statistical answer.
A more detailed description of the three-point coding scheme
scorers used is provided in Appendix C. In order to assess
reliability, one-fourth of the data were randomly selected and
coded by the author and one other person. There was exact
Table 2
Average Scores Based on Fonp and Nisbett Three-point ToHin^
System for Two Testing Sessions
Problem Type
Training ^^^^ Lure FA
^^^"P first second first second first second
Minimum 1.861 1.750 1.583 1.583 1.583 1.583
(.112) (.138) (.120) (.104) (.229) (.260)
Rule 1.944 1 i 750 1,792 1.500 1.417
Repeating
(.178) (.167) (.131) (.096) (.195) (.193)
Expanded 1,833 1,938 1.917 1.792 1.167 1.583
Explan.
(.195) (.213) (.120) (.130) (.112) (.229)
Full 2.056 1.938 1.917 1.792 1.833 1.833
(.122) (.138) (.120) (.130) (.208) (.167)
Average 1.924 1.885 1.792 1.740 1.521 1.604
Note: Maximum possible score=3. Mean scores are followed by the
standard errors of the means in parenthesis.
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agreement for 75% of the problems. Table 2 shows the mean
scores and standard errors according to the three-point coding by
group, for each of the previously discussed totals.
Once again, the overall level of performance did not appear
to be good. All of the average scores were less than 2, with 1.924
as the highest. Averaged across testing times the averages for test,
lure, and false alarm problems were approximately 1.9, 1.8 and 1.5
respectively. When analysis of variance tests were performed, no
significant differences were found between groups for test
problem performance in either the first or second session.
Although there was some tendency for the scores to be higher for
the full training condition (group 4) than the others, e.g. test
question average 2.04 as opposed to 1.81, 1.93, and 1.89 for
groups 1, 2 and 3 respectively, the estimated effect sizes were
small. Given the estimated effect sizes and variances, power
calculations indicated that in order to have a power of .9 for the
group main effect, sample sizes of 83 and 50 would be required for
the lure and false alarm problems respectively. The estimated
effect size for the test problems was zero. It is important to note
that the average scores were all approximately between 1.5 and
2.0, with one exception being the expanded explanation's average
score for the false alarms in the first testing session. Thus on
average, subjects performed just below the "poor statistical
reasons" level. The lack of differences between groups is
particularly obvious when looking at average scores in the second
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testing session for groups 2, 3 and 4 on test problems and lure
problems.
No significant differences were found on levels of
performance between the first and second testing sessions for any
of the groups. Additionally, no significant effects were found for
question order.
Analysis of Rationales
In addition to the quantitative analyses, qualitative analyses
of the rationales subjects gave for their answers were also
performed. Subjects' answers were coded as being consistent with
one of twenty-two rationales. The twenty-two rationales were
divided into seven broad categories which are listed and briefly
described below.
1) No regard for sample size. That is, sample size is mentioned and
discounted, or any sample is said to be good.
2) Bigger is somehow better. This includes the extremely
simplistic statements that say nothing more than bigger is better.
3) No regard for data. Generally, this included statements
indicating information other than the given data was more
important in analyzing the questions than the data.
4) Small samples are inadequate. Rationales in this category
included pointing out some problem with using a small sample to
make conclusions about a population.
5) Big samples are adequate. Rationales including some statement
about why big samples are adequate.
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Some comparison hetwe.en snmp les These rationales generally
indicated the deepest understanding of the importance of sample
size.
7) Other. Generally these were somewhat nonsensical,
restatements of the problem, or otherwise virtually impossible to
classify.
The seven categories and twenty-two rationales which were used
for the coding were generated by looking at subjects rationales and
attempting to create a coding system which would accurately
describe the differences in the types of answers received. Table 3
and the subsequent analyses are based on the seven broad
categories. However, it is informative to look at the more specific
types of rationales which were included in each category (See
Appendix D). The purpose of coding the results in this manner was
to prevent false indications of understanding the LLN. It was also
to obtain the maximum amount of information about what subjects
do understand and are able to express compared to what concepts
they do not seem to understand. Two scorers each scored one-
fourth of the data and produced 77% agreement in the categorical
coding, one of those scorers also scored the remaining data.
Table 3 provides frequency distributions for the categories of
rationales used for each type of problem, collapsed across testing
time. Approximately 5% of the rationales given could not be
classified as being part of only one category, and were therefore
included in both of the appropriate categories. Because each
testing group had different total numbers of rationales, the
distributions are reported in percentages.
39
Table 3
Frequency Distribution s of the Rationale Categories Used
by Group. Collapsed Across Testing Times
Rationale Category
Type of
Question Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Test 1 6.8 23.9 28.4 17.0 1.1 12.5 10.2
2 8.0 18.2 14.8 25.0 0.0 19.3 14.8
3 13.0 7.6 13.0 23.9 2.2 22.8 17.4
4 9.2 5.8 17.2 20.7 0.0 37.9 9.2
Lures 1 7.6 41.5 15.1 7.6 3.8 11.3 13.2
2 8.3 37.5 8.3 4.2 2.1 25.0 14.6
3 24.1 13.0 11.1 13.0 9.3 22.2 7.4
4 20.0 10.0 12.0 6.0 0.0 40.0 12.0
False
Alarms i 4.2 0.0 58.3 0.0 25.0 8.3 4.2
2 0.0 0.0 70.8 4.2 16.7 4.2 4.2
3 0.0 0.0 50.0 8.3 25.0 4.2 12.5
4 0.0 0.0 29.2 12.5 37.5 20.8 0.0
Note: The numbers listed are percentages of the total number of
rationales for that row.
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Differences were found in the kinds of rationales that
subjects who received different kinds of training provided. For
example, subjects in group four (full training) consistently had the
highest percentage of rationales from category 6, which includes
most sophisticated rationales, those which comparing the sample
sizes in the problems. The percentage of category 6 rationales for
the full training group was 39.0 for test and lure problems
combined, and 20.8 for false alarm problems
. The corresponding
figures for the minimum, rule repeating and expanded explanation
training groups were 11.9 and 8.3, 22.2 and 4.2, and 22.5 and 4.2
respectively. Additionally, the minimum training group had the
highest percentage of rationales from category 2, a simple version
of "bigger is better". The minimum training group had 23.9% of
test and 41.5% of lure problem rationales from category 2, whereas
the percent of rationales from category 2 for the full training
group were 5.8% for test problems and 10% for lure problems.
Another important trend to notice in Table 3 is that groups 1 and 2
performed similarly to each other, but different than groups 3 and
4, which also performed quite similarly. Collapsing the
percentages from groups 1 and 2 and groups 3 and 4, the resulting
percentages for test questions rationales in category 2 become 21%
compared to 6.7%, and for category 6, 15.9% versus 30.3%
respectively. Although subjects from different training conditions
did not perform significantly different on problems, it appears that
they relied on different rationales to answer the problems.
In order to test whether the mentioned differences in the
types of rationales subjects used were significant, the previous
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categorical scores were divided into "good" statistical reasons and
"poor" statistical reasons. For test questions, rationales from
categories 4, 5, and 6 were considered to be "good" and were given
a score of 1, while all other rationales were given a score of 0.
Although rationales from category 1 might have been more
appropriate for lure problems than those from categories 4, 5, and
6, the lures and false alarms were also given the 1,0 coding in
order to see if subjects were using the more sophisticated
rationales on all problems, including those that did not necessarily
require their use. Additionally if subjects used the more simple or
the more sophisticated rationales on all kinds of problems, it is
interesting to know whether the use of the rationales lead to
correct or incorrect answers. Average scores from the 1,0
rationales coding were obtained for test questions and false
alarms/lures (FA/L) for each subject. Using this system, the
maximum possible score would be 7 for the test questions and 13
overall. The means and standard errors are listed in Table 4.
These means indicate that none of the groups performed
exceptionally well. The full training group (group four) received
the highest scores overall, however, their means are only 3.667
and 3.350 for the test questions and the false alarm/lures
respectively. Across groups the mean scores are all less than half
of the maximum possible. The scores for group four were found to
be significantly higher than those for group one (minimal training)
on both the test questions and the FA/L problems (F(l,44)=5.253,
p<.05; F(l,44)=5.031 p<.05). Significant differences between groups
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Table 4
Mean Numher of Sophisticated R^tion.Uc Used bv Gronp fnr T.ot
and False Alarm(FA)/Lure ProhlprnQ
Questions
Training
Group Test FA/Lure Tntnl
Minimum 1.833 (.366) 1.583 (.484) 3 417
Rule
Repeated 2.833 (.626) 1.833 (.534) 4.667
Expanded
ExpIan. 2.917 (.763) 2.417 (.570) 5.333
Full - 3.667 (.414) 3.250 (.509) 6.917
Average 2.813 2.271 5.083
Note: Each subject received 7 test questions and 6 FA/Lure
questions. These scores are based on a 1,0 scale, in which subjects
received a 1 for an answer which belonged to category 4, 5, or 6.
three and four compared to groups one and two were also found
for the false alarm and lure problems (F(l,44)=4.585, p<.05).
Other Results
There are a few other results that should be mentioned.
First of all, none of the analyses indicate significant differences
between the first and second testing sessions. Secondly, subjects
in all groups performed quite differently on various questions.
Table 5 shows the mean scores across groups for each question
according to the l=correct, O=incorrect coding. It is interesting to
note how well subjects performed on the open-ended questions as
compared to the other test questions. For example, the average
score across groups for the open-ended test questions was
approximately
.69, whereas the average for the multiple choice
test questions was approximately .38. Likewise, the average
across groups on false alarm questions was approximately .69, but
the average for lure questions is approximately .42. These
differences are particularly interesting when one considers the
previous research done on understanding the LLN. Kahneman and
Tversky (1972; Tversky & Kahneman 1971, 1974) have
consistently used multiple choice problems and concluded that
people do not understand the LLN well, yet Fong and Nisbett
(1991; Fong et al. 1986) have used open-ended problems and
concluded that people can learn and use the LLN appropriately.
One inherent difference in the problems types is the chance level
of performance. For the open-ended problems random guessing
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Table 5
Mean Scores for Each Problem bv Grnnp
Group
Question Min. Rule Expan. Full
Open Bnded
Test
IRS .750 .833 .833 .750 .792
Slot .583 .583 .583 .583 .583
False
Alarms
Brew .917 .917 .750 .667 .813
Audit coo.583 .500 .583 .583 .563
Multiple
Choice
Lures
roll O T O.333 .500 .667 .583 .521
risn Q 1
0
.333 o o o.333 o o o.333 o o o.333 .333
rers
o o o
.333 OCA.250 .661 .417 .417
1 .uept. /I 1 T.41/ coo
. 5 o3
. 167 .417
Center
Book .750 .333 .417 .583 .521
Tennis .583 .500 .583 .500 .542
Tail
Blood .250 .333 .333 .333 .313
Hosp .333 .417 .417 .417 .396
Women .000 .167 .333 .333 .208
Geol .000 .333 .333 .500 .292
Note: Mean scores for each question based on 0,1 coding in which
subjects received a 1 for a correct score. The problems are all
listed in Appendix B.
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would yield a performance level of. 5, but for the multiple choice
questions random guessing would yield .33.
It is also important to notice the differences in performance
on the cemer and tail versions of the multiple choice questions
with averages across groups being .53 and .30. This difference is
consistent with the differences obtained by Well et al. (1990).
However, even within problem type there were differences in the
way subjects performed on different questions. Subjects' overall
average on the IRS problem (.79) was much better than the
average on the slot machme problem (.58) and likewise, better on
the brewery problem (.81) than on the auditor problem (.56). On
multiple choice questions subjects performed better on the
pollution problem (.52) than on the fish hatchery problem (.33),
and better on the hospital problem (.39) than on the women's
heights problem (.21). The manner in which a question was
worded made a big difference in subjects' performance levels.
One of the most interesting questions that arises from the
analyses that were conducted concerns the extent to which the
performance levels on the various coding schemes correlate. The
correlations between the number of correct answers and the
number of sophisticated rationales for each subject by group were
calculated in order to gain understanding as to whether or not
subjects do give correct answers with poor rationales and wrong
answers with sophisticated rationales (See Table 6). Due to large
standard errors there are no interesting significant differences
between any of the correlation coefficients even though some of
the coefficients appear to be quite different from others. In
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Table 6
Correlation Coefficien ts for Number nf Correct An.w^rc
and Number of Sophisticated Answers
Correlations for Test
Problems
Group Tcf rcr rfr
1
.747 .723 ,793
.856 .833 .888
.402 .902 .442
.847 .630 .803
Note: rcf=correlation coefficient for correctness score
and Fong et al. coding score
rcr=correlation coefficient for correctness score and
rationales score (avg. number of scores 4, 5 and 6s)
rfr=correlation coefficient for Fong et al. coding scores and
rationales score
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particular, the expanded explanation group's coefficients for the
correlations between the correct score and the Fong et al. coding
and between the Fong et al. coding and the quality of rationales,
stand out because they are so much smaller than the other test
question correlations. Scatterplots of these relationships indicate
the expanded explanation group's low rcf for test questions
appears to be mainly due to one outlier and the low rfr for test
questions appears to be due to the fact that the data are in two
clusters.
The correlations were also calculated for the false alarm/lure
problems, however, due to the fact that the rationales coding for
these types of problems is not necessarily indicative of
understanding the LLN correctly, these coefficients have been
omitted. However, as one would expect, many of the correlations
for rcf and rcr are negative.
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CHAPTER III
DISCUSSION
The present results do not seem to support the results of
Fong et al. (1986) and Fong and Nisbett (1991) about the
effectiveness of training. The analysis conducted for the codmg
scheme used by Fong et al. (1986) and Fong and Nisbett (1991)
indicates that subjects may not in fact be learning all that Fong et
al. (1986) and Fong and Nisbett (1991) claimed they were leaming.
No significant differences in between-group performance were
found in the present study. However, the mean scores found using
the three-point coding scheme were similar to those reported by
Fong and Nisbett (1991). With the exception of the full training
group in the present study, the means for all of the conditions in
both studies were between 1.5 and 2.0. Although the group means
were found to be significantly different in the Fong and Nisbett
(1991) study, power calculations indicate that much larger groups
would be needed to find significant differences between the
groups in a replication of the present study for the false alarm and
lure problems (50 and 83 subjects per condition respectively, as
opposed to the 12 subjects per condition that we used). Even
though the group means for the test questions suggested an
advantage for the more extensive training conditions, the analysis
of variance F for the condition main effect was less than 1,
suggesting an effect size equal to 0. This information suggests two
things. First of all, despite the fact that the effects Fong et al.
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report were statistically significant, these effects were in fact quite
small, and statistical significance was found because of the large
sample sizes and numerous problems given. Additionally, it is
apparent that the performance of subjects in the present study
and in Fong et al.'s studies were poor, with scores on the average
below 2.00, which was the score given for a "poor" statistical
reason.
The analysis based on the number of correct answers also
indicated poor performance by subjects. Not only were there no
significant differences between groups for this measure, but also
the estimated effect sizes for test questions, false alarms and lures
were all equal to 0. None of the groups of subjects performed very
well. In Table 1 we see that the mean scores for each problem
type were less than or equal to .5 for one half of the overall
averages. Average proportion correct for first and second testings
of the lure problems across groups was .42 and .43 respectively,
barely better than the .33 that would be obtained by randomly
choosing an answer. For the open-ended problems (test and false
alarms) chance performance was .5; that is, in order to receive a
score of 1 the subject merely needed to correctly agree or disagree
with a stated conclusion. Therefore, chance performance for
testing questions (two open ended and five muhiple choice) would
be equal to .38. Across groups and testing times the subjects'
average score was equal to .46. Subjects did perform much better
on the false alarm problems, with the overall average being
approximately equal to .69.
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Few subjects in any of the groups performed well on all of
the problems. No subjects correctly answered every problem.
Only two subjects (one from group 2, one from group 3) correctly
answered all of the test questions, and only two subjects (both
from group 4) correctly answered all of the false alarms and lures.
Four subjects (two from group 3, two from group four) missed one
test question, and four subjects (one from group 1, one from group
2, two from group 3) missed one false alarm/lure. Only three of
the 48 subjects in the entire study missed one or less on both test
questions and false alarms/lures.
Although no significant differences were found in the
quantitative analyses, the story changes a little bit when we look
at the qualitative analysis of rationales. Subjects in the advanced
training groups may not have provided any more correct answers
than the subjects with minimal training, but, they did attempt to
use more sophisticated rationales. Looking at the frequency
distributions from Table 3, we see that subjects in the full training
condition were more likely than any of the other training groups to
use rationales from category 6, which is considered to contain the
most advanced rationales (37.93% vs. 18.22% average on test
questions for groups 1, 2, and 3). However, the full training group
had the lowest correlation between number of correct answers and
number of sophisticated rationales used for test questions (see
Table 6). This suggests that subjects attempted to use the
knowledge obtained in the training sessions, but did not know how
to do so. This evidence clearly conflicts with the formalist theory.
That is, subjects did not, as the formalist theory would suggest,
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learn an abstract rule and properly apply it across domains.
Rather, they appear to have learned the key words without
understanding the concepts any better than subjects who received
less training.
Given that subjects do not adequately learn how to correctly
apply the LLN to the problems they are given in the brief training
sessions, the question becomes, what exactly were the subjects
learning? Looking at Table 3, we see that subjects from different
groups gave different kinds of rationales. The subjects in the
minimum training and rule repeated conditions tended to use
rationale 2 (bigger samples are...), much more frequently than
subjects in the expanded explanation and full training conditions
(21.02% vs. 6.68% on test questions; 39.55% vs. 11.48% on lures).
Rationales in this category include extremely simplistic, not
applicable, or generally wrong statements about big samples such
as, "Bigger samples give greater chances for getting anything",
"bigger samples give bigger percentages", etc. These are the types
of statements that subjects might have learned from the minimum
training and rule repeated conditions, or already knew before they
received any training. However, subjects in the expanded
explanation and full training conditions seemed to learn more
complex statements about the LLN, and regardless of how well
they understood the statements, they attempted to use them.
Although some people may consider this memorization learning,
these subjects certainly did not learn in the sense of
understanding, rather they simply remembered key phrases.
5 2
As was mentioned in the introduction, it is extremely
importam to define exactly what is meam by understanding the
LLN. For a statistician this probably means understanding why all
of the statistical analyses one does can be done, and the
implications of sample size on all of the statistics the analyses
produce. However, for the purposes of this training study, we can
consider understanding the LLN to be understanding the ideas of
accuracy and variability and the effects of sample size on these
concepts. For example, simply saying "A bigger sample is better",
would not be indicative of true understanding of the LLN.
Although it is possible that a subject who provided such an answer
may have a thorough understanding of the LLN, this does not seem
likely for a number of reasons. One reason is that if the subject
did truly understand the LLN, he or she should be able to answer
most or all of the problems correctly. No subjects in this study
correctly answered every problem. Only three of the 48 subjects
in the entire study missed one or less on both test questions and
false alarms/lures. This indicates that perhaps three subjects had
an adequate understanding of the LLN.
It is also unlikely that those providing only simplistic
rationales had a good understanding of the LLN because the
subjects were strongly encouraged to explain as well as possible
why they choose the answer that they did. Most subjects took the
time to write quite a bit for their rationales. Subjects who gave an
answer such as "bigger samples are better" generally provided
more words that either did not say anything more, or were
irrelevant. When subjects did know more, they usually wrote
53
more, providing answers like those listed in category 6 (see
Appendix D). However, as the correlation coefficients show (see
Table 6) subjects who used rationales from category 6 did not
always provide coirect answers. It is encouraging to note that the
correlations between the number of times sophisticated rationales
were used and the number of correct answers on test questions for
groups the minimal, rule repeated, and expanded explanation
training groups were all quite high,
.723, .833, and .902
respectively. However, due to the fact that the correlation
coefficient for the full training group (group 4) was only .630, the
coefficients are difficult to interpret.
It appears that the subjects in the first three groups that
showed sophisticated reasoning knew how to apply this reasoning
to test questions. The high correlation for the expanded
explanation group might be due to the fact that those subjects
were required to attempt to answer a question similar to the more
difficuh testing questions at the beginning of their training
sessions. Therefore, those subjects that were interested in learning
how to correctly answer the problem were primed to learn the
reasoning behind the correct answer. However, it is difficult to
understand why the correlation coefficients were higher for the
minimum training and rule repeated conditions than they were for
the full training condition. Perhaps the few subjects in the former
two groups who did perform well had some knowledge about the
LLN prior to the study, although none of the subjects had
previously had a statistics course. The subjects in the full training
condition, like those in the expanded explanation condition, also
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received example problems in their training. However, their
example problems were more like the "easier" testing problems
than the more "difficult" problems (based on how subjects
performed overall). Although they may have then been better
able to answer problems like the examples, this knowledge may
not have transferred to the more difficult multiple choice
questions. Their example problems were also given at the end of
the training, rather than at the beginning. Thus they could not
have been primed to learn how to answer probabilistic questions
at the beginning of their training.
The analysis of the rationales not only provided information
about what subjects learned in the training conditions, it also
inadvertently provided information about some basic concepts
with which students have difficulty. One somewhat surprising
finding was the lack of understanding of basic mathematical
concepts, such as percentages or proportions. For example, many
subjects continually provided rationales indicating that bigger
samples give bigger percentages. This rationale did in fact lead
many of the subjects to correctly answer some of the questions.
However, it is an indication of a lack of understanding of
percentages. Given their lack of basic mathematical
understanding, it is not surprising that many undergraduates have
difficulties understanding probabilistic and statistical rules.
It is important to understand the implications of the present
study for the empiricist/formalist debate. Although the current
results do not directly support either position, they seem to
contradict the formalist theory in particular. Subjects did not
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correctly apply what they were taught m training, nor did they
appear to rely on an abstract rule. Although the current study
lacking in statistical power, the estimated effect sizes for analyses
of the test questions based on both of the quantitative coding
schemes were zero. This indicates that minimal training was as
effective as any of the training employed. However, looking at the
analysis of rationales, we see that there are discrepancies in the
types of rationales on which subjects rely. This is the point at
which the empirical and formalist debate becomes confusing.
After training, subjects appear to attempt to use the rules that
they were taught, by providing simplistic rationales with words
sunilar to those used in training. However, they do not do this
very well. In fact, this effort tends to lead many of them to the
incorrect answers. Therefore, one can not say that subjects are
correctly using an abstract inferential rule. One can only say that
subjects are attempting to use rules that they do not understand.
Does this then support the empirical point of view? The
results do not strongly support the view. However, it seems that
subjects learned a specific rule and attempted to use it. The rules
they used were not always appropriate, so in some sense they did
attempt to use a domain specific rule. However, with a better
understanding of the rules, subjects might have been able to use
the rule correctly. However, trained subjects do not perform any
worse on the false alarms and lures than the subjects who were
not trained, indicating they do not necessarily over-apply the rule.
Yet they also do not perform any better on the test questions,
indicating that maybe they did not really learn how to use the
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LLN. These results make it difficult to discern exactly what
subjects learned from training. We can look at the qualitative
results and find the words that subjects have learned, but that
brings us back to the question, what is learning? Being able to
recall the words that describe a concept may be considered by
some to be learning. In effect, it is learning; leaming words.
However, it is not leaming the concept. In order to learn a concept
one must go beyond memorizing words to understanding ideas.
At what point do people make the leap from memorization to
understanding? Although this question is extremely difficuh to
answer, several people have attempted to answer it. Holland et al.
(1986) consider knowledge to be represented in terms of
hierarchical rule structures. According to their theory, we reason
based on a rule hierarchy built through induction. In this
hierarchy we store a basic default value that we generally use to
solve problems. These default rules are usually predictive and are
therefore followed in most circumstances. However, in certain
instances these default rules are overridden by specific level
exception categories and rules. According to Holland et al. (1986),
the default hierarchy is a way of representing generalizations that
can be used to model the world.
People may attempt to reason statistically by depending on a
default hierarchy similar to that referred to in the inductive
reasoning literature (Holland et al., 1986). Rather than
transferring abstractly across domains, or only reasoning within
the given domain, perhaps people simply use a default value that
is always available to them. This is not to say that default values
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do not change with training. It also does not mean that the
hierarchy has to change with training. People will rely on the most
basic level of knowledge that they have that seems to work.
The simplistic form of the LLN, "bigger is better", (when
taking samples from a population) has been referred to as a
statistical concept people learn early in life (Nisbett et al. 1983).
This may be learned through experience in several areas of life,
and used without understanding the more detailed and technical
aspects of the LLN. Thus, early in life a default value may fall into
place which is something like, "a small sample is not necessarily
indicative of a large population, rather a large sample is better".
When people experience events that require an explanation, they
may try to understand it by falling back on this basic reasoning. If
the LLN were placed in a hierarchy people may have "bigger is
better when samples are taken" as their default value. Unless this
hierarchy for the LLN is further buih upon, people will use this
basic reasoning in any situation in which it seems applicable. This
is true even if the event should not be explained by such a rule
but a person can find no better rule to apply.
An important part of the LLN lies in the fact that it is not one
concept. Rather, it consists of many subconcepts each of which can
be learned and explained without reference to the LLN. These
concepts include accuracy, variability, regression to the mean,
sample distributions, sampling distributions, population
distributions, estimation, confidence intervals, and others.
However, all of these subconcepts are strongly tied to the overall
concept. For example, it is quite possible to answer a LLN question
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with "bigger is better" without knowing about what regression to
the mean is, let alone knowing that when taking samples, extreme
averages will eventually be balanced by averages that approach
the population mean. While it may not be necessary for all
subjects to understand all statistical concepts in order to get the
gist of the LLN, if "bigger is better" is all that they know, it should
not be claimed that they have correctly obtained the abstract rule.
However, when people acquire more training in statistics,
they build more branches off of their main default level. Not only
do they then have more branches which can be used to access
specific concepts within the LLN, such as regression to the mean,
but these branches also become more complex. That is, the
definitions for each subconcept become more complex. Thus, the
expert is able to identify specific exceptions to the basic rules on
which the novices rely. That is not to say that the experts will not
use the default rules; on the contrary, they will remain the most
frequent and standard explanations. Yet, the expert has additional
knowledge from which can be derived more accurate answers to
problems that need an explanation beyond the basic default rule.
While to the expert it may seem that each aspect that is a part of
the overall concept of the LLN is intimately tied to the others, I do
not think that this is how the novice thinks.
If each aspect of the LLN has its own branch off of the
default value it would be possible to correctly answer many
probabilistic questions after some training, with only a partial
understanding of the overall concept. I think that this may be
what has happened to subjects in statistical training studies. The
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training builds upon the basic default value rule the subjects
already have. One could call this defauh rule an extremely basic
abstract rule. While this is better than no knowledge, it may not
be accurate knowledge, rather, it may be lacking in important
concepts, and overapplied where it is not necessary. However, I do
feel that with training people can be taught not to overapply their
default rule, perhaps by being shown examples in which their
defauh rule does not apply. They can also be taught that the rule is
a simple way of expressing several statistical concepts, and that
they should be aware of the fact that exceptions to that rule exist.
In the present study, subjects with minimal training
probably either used the defauh rule that they already had, or
attempted to use the simplistic rule they were given in training as
their default rule. Therefore, they were able to answer some of
the questions correctly, but did not possess a knowledge structure
adequate to correctly answer all of the questions nor to provide
sophisticated rationales for doing so. However, the more advanced
training groups probably attempted to either change their defauh
rule to something more complex than they previously had, or to
extend their already existing default rule without truly
understanding what the new words they had been taught meant in
terms of what they already knew. Thus, they probably did not
know how to correctly use their new knowledge. Perhaps this was
because they thought that it now applied to more situations than
they had previously been aware, or they thought that it no longer
applied to the situations for which their old rule had been
appropriate.
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It appears that it is not possible to teach subjects a great deal
about the LLN in brief training sessions. Educators must be aware
of the fact that the concepts are not so simplistic that they can be
quickly learned and readily applied by students. Perhaps the
wisest thing that educators could do would be to attempt to teach
students one part of the LLN at a time, and then after students
have learned something about that subconcept only to claim that
their students understand that specific concept, not that they have
an understanding of the LLN. We must be cautious in claiming
that students understand concepts for which they only have a
simplistic default rule. Once we have claimed that they
understand a concept, we might close the door to needed further
education that we assume is auxiliary. It is imperative that we not
only teach students important probabilistic concepts, but also that
we show them how to apply these concepts to various situations.
Students' hierarchical knowledge structures must not only contain
rules, but also levels which include information about practical
applications of the rules contained within the hierarchy.
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APPENDIX A
TRAINING MATERIALS
1. CONTROL GROUP
The Law of Large Numbers is a rule that states that as the
size of a random sample increases, its distribution becomes
a more accurate estimate of the distribution of the
population. That is, bigger samples are more like the
population from which they are drawn than small samples
are.
2. RULE REPEATING CONDITION
The Law of Laree Numbers is an important rule in
probability and statistics theories. This rule states that as the size
of a random sample increases, the sample distribution is more and
more likely to get closer and closer to the population distribution.
In other words, the larger the sample, the better it is as an
estimate of the population.
Therefore according to this rule, when you randomly select a
sample from a population the larger the sample, the better the
sample is in estimating the population. Once again the larger the
sample is that you draw, the better that sample is in estimating
the population. This is an important rule to know in many
probability and statistics problems.
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3. EXPANDED EXPLANATION
Post Office Problem
When they turn 18, American males must register at a local
post office. In addition to other information, the height of each
male is obtained. The national average height for 18-year-old
males is 69 inches.
Every day for one year, 10 men registered at a small post
office and 100 men registered at a big post office. At the end of
each day a clerk at each post office computed and recorded the
average height of the men who registered there that day.
Which would you expect to be true? (Circle One)
(1) The number of days on which the average height was more
than 71 inches was greater for the small post office than for the
big post office.
(2) The number of days on which the average height was more
than 71 inches was greater for the big post office than for the
small post office.
(3) There is no reason to expect that the number of days on which
the average height was more than 71 inches was greater for one
post office than for the other.
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The Post Office problem that you have just answered is one
that people often have difficulty solving. On the following page is
an explanation that seems to help people understand it.
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LLN EXPLANATION
We often wish to find out about the characteristics of large
numbers of individuals. For example, we might wish to estimate
the percentage of voters in New Hampshire who are Republicans,
the average family income in Suffolk County, or the average height
of male students at UMass. If we were interested in the average
height of the entire POPULATION of males at UMass, we could
measure each one of the approximately 13,000 males on campus
and find the average of these measurements. However, this would
be very time consuming. We could get an estimate of the average
height in the population by randomly selecting a SAMPLE from the
population, and using the average of the sample as our estimate.
Suppose we randomly selected a sample of 10 men and used the
average height of the sample as our estimate of the average height
of the population. Although we would not expect the average
height of a sample of 10 men to provide a perfect estimate of the
population average, it would provide some information about the
population average and would give us a better estimate than if we
randomly chose just one male student to base our estimate on his
height.
We could see how accurate an estimate based on a sample of
10 men is by randomly selecting samples of size 10 over and over
and looking at the values of the averages from each of those
samples. If each sample average were a perfect estimate of the
population average, then every sample average would be exactly
equal to the population average. If we actually went out an
obtained the averages of a large number of samples, we would find
that not all of the averages would be exactly equal to the
population average. Although there would be some "spread" or
variability in the values of the sample averages, there would be
less spread in the averages than there would be in the heights of
the individual males in the population. Thus if we based our
estimate on the average height of a randomly selected sample of
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10 men It is hkely to more accurate than if we based our estimate
on the height of one male randomly selected from the population
Also, almost everyone has the intuition that if we wanted to
get an extremely accurate estimate of the population average we
should use a large sample average as an estimate. Larger samples
provide more accurate estimates of characteristics of the
population than small samples do. If we selected random samples
of size 100, we would find that the averages from these samples
tended to be closer to the population average than the averages
from samples of size 10. The averages of larger samples will tend
to have values closer to the population average-that is, there will
be less variability in their values because they tend to estimate
the population average more accurately.
Even when an estimate is based on the average of a sample
there is some chance that the estimate will be quite different than
the true average of the population. For example, it is possible that
the average height of a random sample of 10 men will differ from
the population average by more than 2 inches. However, the
bigger the sample, the less likely it is that the sample average will
differ from the population average by that much.
If accuracy was our only concern, we would always base our
estimates about populations on very large samples. However,
when sampling is done in the real world to find out information
about the population, (like in political polls), the costs of
conducting the survey have to be considered as well as the
accuracy. There are ways of figuring out how large a sample has
to be in order to obtain a desired level of accuracy.
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4. FULL TRAINING
Abstract Training
Imagine an jar that is filled with marbles. Let's say that the
jar contains a very large number of marbles-thousands, millions,
or larger. The marbles in this jar are known collectively as the
population .
Let's say that there are two type of marbles in the jar-black
marbles and white marbles. When we do this, we can now say
that the population has two categories or groups, namely—black
marbles and white marbles.
Now let's say that in this population of black and white
marbles there are 70% white marbles and 30% black marbles. If
that is the case, then we know more than that the population has
two categories (black and white): we now know the proportion of
the marbles in the white category (70%) and the proportion of the
marbles in the black category (30%). This is known as the
population distribution (other examples of distributions are 60%
black and 40% white, or 85% white and 15% black, etc., but in
every distribution the sum of the proportions must be 100%).
So far we know:
—A population is the entire set of objects we are interested
in (all of the marbles in the jar)
-- Categories refers to the types of objects in the population
(black and white)
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-Distribution refers to the proportion of objects in each
category (70% white an 30% black in this example)
One of the major goals of statistics is to find out something
about a population. More specifically, we want to find out what
the population distribution is. One way that we might do this
would be to actually examine all of the objects in the population
and count up the number of objects in each category. In our
example, we could empty the entire jar and count the number of
black marbles and the number of white marbles. Using this
method, we could find out exactly what the population distribution
of black and white marbles was.
But, there is a very serious problem with counting all of the
objects in the population: populations tend to be very large. If we
were to count all of the objects in our marble population, it would
take more time and effort than would be practical (imagine
counting a million marbles!). So counting the entire population is
impractical. What do we do instead to find out what the
population distribution is?
What we do instead is to take a sample of the population. A
sample is a subset of the population. We can take a sample of any
size— if we pick 5 marbles, we say that the sample size is 5; if we
take 60 marbles for our sample, we say that the sample size is 60,
and so on.
When we take a sample from the population, we will get a
distribution of the sample. The sample distribution is the
proportion of objects in each category for the sample, just as the
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population distribution is the proportion of objects in each
category for the population. For example, if we take a sample of
10 marbles, we might get 6 blacks and 4 whites. In this case, our
sample distribution would be 60% black and 40% white. We also
might have happened to get 9 whites and 1 black, in which case
the sample distribution would be 90% white and 10% black.
The important point here is that samples are estimates of
populations. Since it is often impractical or sometimes impossible
to examine the entire population, we instead have to draw samples
to estimate what the population is like.
Some samples will have sample distributions that are close to
the population distribution than others. For instance, in our
marble example, a sample of 9 blacks and 1 white would be a very
poor estimate of the population, while a sample of 8 whites and 2
blacks would be a pretty good estimate of the population.
The critical question is: What determines how likely it is
that samples will give good estimates of the population? The
answer is simple: if all of the samples are chosen haphazardly, or
randomly (by, for example, mixing the jar and reaching into the jar
blindfolded and scooping out the needed number of marbles), then
there is only one factor—sample size .
This brings us to the Law of Large Numbers : as the size of a
random sample increases, the sample distribution is more and
more likely to get closer and closer to the population distribution.
In other words, the larger the sample, the better it is as an
estimate of the population.
69
Verbal Presentation
Now that you have all read the written explanation of the
Law of Large Numbers, I thought it would be nice to demonstrate,
before your eyes, that the Law of Large Numbers really does work.
So I have here (pick jar up, etc.) a genuine jar, filled with
genuine black and white marbles. And as in the written
explanation, there happen to be 70% white marbles and 30% black
marbles in this jar.
A major purpose of statistics is to find out about a population
from a sample of that population. Suppose it is your job to find out
what proportion of the marbles in this jar are white and what
proportion of the marbles are black. You could dump out all of the
marbles and count all of them, but that would take quite a long
time and wouldn't be worth the effort. For the sake of
demonstration, this jar isn't very large. But if we had a very large
jar filled with millions of marbles, it's easy to see how time-
consuming and impractical it would be to count the entire
population of marbles in the jar.
What you would probably do instead to find out what the
composition of the jar was like would be to take a sample from the
jar because the sample you chose would tell you something about
the population; that is, the sample would be an estimate for the
population.
According to the Law of Large Numbers, when you choose
your sample randomly like this (reach into jar without looking, mix
them up, and draw out a handful), the larger the sample, the
better the sample is in estimating the population. To repeat--the
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larger the sample is that you draw, the better that sample is in
estimating the population.
Well
,
what I'm going to do now is to demonstrate the Law of
Large Numbers, (reveal blackboard with summary chart) I will
pick samples of size 1, 4, and 25 ( gesture to the three sections of
the board as you say the numbers) to show that as the sample size
increases, the sample becomes a better estimate of the population.
For each sample that I draw, I will write down on the board
the number of whites in the sample, the number of blacks in the
sample, the percent of white in the sample, and the deviation or
difference between the sample distribution and the population
distribution (as you are saying the various categories, point to
them on the board).
Now recall that the population distribution for this jar is 70%
white, 30% black. Therefore, for example, if the sample I draw
happens to be 85% white, the deviation of that sample will be 85
minus 70 or 15%, and I'll enter that number here (point to the
deviation column).
I will draw a few samples of size 1, 4, and 25. After I'm
done with drawing samples of each size I will calculate the average
deviation of the samples from the population (point to all three
"Average Deviation" boxes). The Law of Large Numbers states that
as the sample size increases, the sample becomes a better estimate
of the population. In other words the average deviation of the
sample from the population will decrease as the sample size
increases. So this number (point to "Average Deviation" box)
7 1
should go down as sample size (point to top of chart: "Sample Size=
") goes up.
So first I will draw samples of size 1. I will mix up the
marbles like this (mix them while talking) and use this scooper to
pick my sample (demonstrate). OK-the first marble to come out
of the scoop will be my sample (Shake scoop until one drops into
your hand in plain view. If more than one marble comes out, use
the first one that comes out).
In this sample, I have 0 whites and 1 black (for example).
(Go to the board and verbalize as you're writing down the resuhs
of the sample). So in this sample, I had 0 whites, 1 black. That
means that the percent white in the sample was 0%. O minus 70%
equals 70% deviation.
(go back to jar. Put the sample back, empty the scoop into
the jar, and repeat the procedure. I drew 4 samples of size 1. As
you go on you don't have to describe process in as much detail.
After you're finished, compute the average deviation). So, the
average deviation for samples of size 1 is %.
Now I'll pick a few samples of size 4. (Follow the same
procedure as above--mix contents of jar, scoop out some marbles,
pour out the first four marbles which fall into your open hand,
summarize, put sample back in the jar, empty contents of scoop
into jar, etc. Pick 4 samples of size 4 then compute average
deviation). The average deviation for samples of size 4 is %.
(So the same with samples of size 25. Three samples should
be enough. ) With this sample of 25 I have whites and
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blacks (write results on the board). That is _%white and the
deviation is %.
(If you draw 4 samples of size 4 and they're all 3-1, pick
more samples until you have some other sample distribution. If
you draw 3 samples of size 25 and you think your average
deviation might be too close to the avg. deviation for samples of
size 4, draw one or two more.)
Summary
The Law of Large Numbers states that as the size of your
sample increases, the sample becomes a better estimate of the
population. This is shown here: as the samples increased in size
from 1 to 4 to 25 the average deviation of the samples from the
population decreased from % to % to %.
I'd like to tell you something else about the Law of Large
Numbers. That is, with small samples, sometimes you can't even
correctly answer the simplest questions about the population.
For example, suppose you were asked to say whether there
were more white marbles in the jar or more black marbles. If you
happened to draw this sample (point to a very bad sample of size
1: 0 white, 1 black. If there isn't one, then go to the samples of
size 4 and point to a 1 white, 3 black or 2 white, 2 black) you
would say "Well, from my sample, I think there are more blacks
than whites and I would be wrong. But look at the larger sample
of size 25: you can always correctly answer at least the most basic
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question- 'Are there more whites or more blacks?' With smaller
samples, that is not always possible.
So IVe demonstrated the Law of Large Numbers-as the
sample increases in size, the sample becomes a better estimate of
the population.
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Explained Examples
At a large urban university, a student organization used the
computer to select 1500 student numbers at random, and
contacted those selected to ask whether they were willing to have
$20 added to their fees for the construction of a new gym. About
72% of the 1500 students questioned said they would favor such a
fee in order to have expanded athletic facilities. Although the
Dean of Student Services at the university agreed the $20 per
student would probably be adequate to pay the annual mortgage
on a new gym, he argued that: "Since there are a very large
number of students at our university who are from lower and
lower-middle class families, a $20 fee would be quite a hardship
on them. Thus, it is very unlikely that a majority of students at
the university would be willing to have $20 added to their fees for
the new gym. While a majority of the people you asked were in
favor of the fee, it is far from certain that a majority of the entire
student population is in favor of the fee. A great many other
people have not been consulted."
Do you agree with the Dean that it is "far from certain" that a
majority of the student population favors the fee for the new gym?
Explain.
Please consider this problem for a few moments. After you have
considered the problem and analyzed it for a minute or two, turn
the page for an analysis.
7 5
The student organization is trying to assess the attitude of
the students at the university toward spending $20 per student to
build the new gym. In terms of the Law of Large Numbers, they
are trying to find out the population distribution of the university
students' attitudes toward the fee increase. To do this, the
organization randomly selected 1500 students--a sample of size
1500--and asked them if they were in favor of the fee for the new
gym. Of the 1500, 72% were in favor of it (and 28% were against
it). According to the Law of Large Numbers, which states that the
larger the sample, the better it is in estimating the population,
there is overwhelming evidence that a majority of the student
population favors the fee. Recall that in the gumball
demonstration, samples of size 25 were very good estimates of the
population. Thus, it can be concluded that a majority of students
at the university are if favor of the fee.
What about the Dean's argument that it is unlikely that a
majority of the student population favors the fee because they
would consider a $20 fee a hardship? Although this argument
may have intuitive appeal, it should be discounted because it is not
supported by any data, and is in fact contradicted by the large
sample of 1500 students.
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A major New York law firm had a history of hiring only
graduates of large, prestigious law schools. One of the senior
partners decided to try hiring some graduates of smaller less
prestigious law schools. Two such people were hired. Their grades
and general record were similar to those of people from the
prestigious schools hired by the firm. Although their manners and
"style" were not as polished and sophisticated as those of the
predominantly Ivy League junior members of the firm, their
objective performance was excellent. At the end of three years,
both of them were well above average in the number of cases won
and in the volume of law business handled. The senior partner
who had hired them argued to colleagues in the firm that, "This
experience indicates that graduates of less prestigious schools are
at least as ambitious and talented as graduates of the major law
schools. The chief difference between the two types of graduates
is in their social class background, not in their legal ability, which
is what counts."
Comment on the thinking that went into this senior partner's
conclusion. Is the argument basically sound? Does it have
weaknesses? (Disregard your own initial opinion, if you had one,
about graduates of non-prestigious law schools, and concentrate on
the thinking that the senior partner used.)
Please consider this problem for a few moments. After you have
considered the problem and analyzed it for a minute or two, turn
the page for an analysis.
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Ihe senior partner is trying to draw a conclusion about a
certain population. We can think of the members of this
population as newly graduated lawyers, from nonprestigious law
schools, who otherwise meet the law firm's hiring standards. If we
divide the members of this population into two categories,
"excellent" and "mediocre or worse," we can think of the population
distribution as the % in each category. The senior partner has
concluded that the % in the "excellent" category is very high, or
anyway, just as high as in another population, involving graduates
of prestigious law schools. This conclusion was based on observing
a sample of size 2, in which the sample distribution was 100%
"excellent," 0% "mediocre or worse."
Apart from any other considerations, however, the sample
distribution for size 2 is apt to be quite different from the
population distribution: the latter could be only 60% or 50% or
even perhaps as low as 40% "excellent," and a 2-0 sample split
would not be so unusual; just as one would not be at all amazed to
draw 2 out of 2 red gumballs from an urn with only 40% reds. So
the senior partner's attitude is quite unwarranted: a larger sample
is needed.
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APPENDIX B
TESTING MATERDU.S
Fong et al. (1986) open ended prnhl^mc
Slot Machine Problem
For his vacation, Keith decided to drive from his home in
Michigan to California to visit some of his relatives and friends
Shortly after crossing the border to Nevada, Keith pulled into a gas
station and went inside to buy a state map. There, in the comer of
the gas station, were two slot machines. Keith had heard about slot
machines,before, but had never actually seen one. He went over to
the slot machines and looked at them, trying to figure out how
they worked. An old man who was sitting close to the machines
spoke to Keith. "There ain't no winning system for slot machines.
It's all luck. You just put in a coin, pull the lever, and hope that
you'll win. But let me tell you this: some machines are easier to
lose on than others. That's because the owners can change the
mechanism of the slots so that some of them will be more likely to
make you lose. See those two slot machines there? The one on the
left gives you about an even chance of winning, but the one on the
right is fixed so that you; 11 lose much more often than you win.
Take it from me-I've played them for years." The old man then
got up and walked out of the gas station.
Keith was by now very intrigued by the two slot machines,
so he played the machine on the left for a couple of minutes. He
lost almost twice as often as he won. "Humph," Keith said to
himself. "The man said that there was an even chance of winning
at the machine on the left. He's obviously wrong." Keith then tried
the machine on the right for a couple of minutes and ended up
winning more often than be lost. Keith concluded that the man
was wrong about the chances of winning on the two slot machines.
He concluded that the opposite was true-that the slot machine on
the right was more favorable to the player than the machine on
the left.
Comment on Keith's conclusion and his reasoning. Do you agree?
Explain your answer.
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IRS Problem
Martha was excited about her new job with the IRS She
knew that she had been well trained but dreaded spotchecking
incoming tax returns to see what kinds of errors the taxpayers
were making. Every serious error she found meam extra
paperwork for her and she already feh overworked. "I suppose
things just get worse as the deadline approaches," she memioned
to her friend Laura, who had been on the job for several years. "I
guess that people who file near April 15 tend to be in a terrible
hurry and make all kinds of mistakes." "That certainly is my
impression," said Laura. "I must have processed hundreds of
returns last year and found that almost one-quarter of them had
serious errors. Mind you, maybe things will be better this year.
There's been a lot of publicity about tax reform and quite a few TV
spots reminding people to get started working on their tax returns
early."
When they met for lunch a few weeks later, Martha seemed
quite relieved. "Something must be working," she said to Laura.
"Even though there are just about as many returns filed at the last
minute as there were last year, when I picked out ten of them and
went through them carefully, I only found one serious mistake. It
doesn't look like things are going to be nearly as bad as I had
feared."
Comment on Martha's conclusion and her reasoning. Do you agree?
Explain your answer.
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Multiple choice center version prnhl^mc
Book Problem
An investigator studying some properties of language
selected a paperback and computed the average word-length in
every page of the book (i.e., the number of letters on that page
divided by the number of words). Another investigator took the
first line in each page and computed the line's average word-
length (i.e., the number of letters on the first line divided by the
number of words). The average word-length in the entire book is
4 letters. However, not every line or page has exactly that
average. Some may have a higher average word-length, some
lower.
The first investigator counted the number of pages that had
an average word length of between 3 and 5 and the second
investigator counted the number of first lines on a page that had
an average word length of between 3 and 5.
Which of the following would you expect to be true?
(1) The page investigator had a higher percentage of word-
length averages between 3 and 5.
(2) The line investigator had a higher percentage of word-
length averages between 3 and 5.
(3) There is no reason to expect that the percentage of
word-length averages between 3 and 5 would be larger for one
investigator than for the other.
Please write down your reasons for selecting the answer that you
did.
8 1
Blood Type Problem
When a company is hiring new employees often they collect
medical information about the new employee. Part of the
information companies gather is the blood type of each new
employee (in case of an emergency in the workplace). It is known
that the incidence of type O blood in the population of the U.S. is
around 45%, and the remaining 55% have either type A, B, or AB.
A small company, Smith's Steamroller Inc., hires 10 new
people a month. A much larger company, Jones Farm Equipmem
Inc., hires 50 new employees per month. Both companies have
recorded the percentage of type O new employees per month for
the last several years. Which would you expect to be true? (Circle
one)
(1) The number of months in which between 35% and 55% of the
new employees has blood type O was greater for Smith Steamroller
than for Jones Farm Equipment.
(2) The number of months in which between 35% and 55% of the
new employees had blood type O was greater for Jones Farm
Equipment than for Smith Steamroller.
(3) There is no reason to expect the number of months in which
between 35% and 55% of the new employees had blood type O to
be greater for one company than the other.
Please write down your reasons for selecting the answer that you
did.
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Tennis Problem
Two tennis players, Stephanie and Matt were arguing about
how many people they thought played tennis in the U.S. Stephanie
said that she thought very few Americans played because there
are not many big United States tournaments, and schools tend to
have very small tennis teams. Matt insisted that because almost
everyone he knew played tennis, at least half of all Americans
must play tennis.
Stephanie went to the library and found the Statistical
Abstract of the U.S. 1989. In this publication the Bureau of the
Census includes statistics about the activities Americans enjoy. It
states the 15% of Americans play tennis.
After reading this report Matt thought that it was ridiculous.
He and Stephanie decided to take a random poll on the streets of
Boston in order to find out how many Bostonians play tennis.
Every day for 2 weeks they each conducted their own survey.
Each day Matt stopped 10 people and Stephanie stopped 100.
Which of the following would you expect to be true?
(1) Stephanie had more days in which she found between
10% and 20% of the people surveyed played tennis than Matt did.
(2) Matt had more days in which he found between 10%
and 20% of the people surveyed played tennis than Stephanie did.
(3) There is no reason to expect that either one of them had
more days in which they found between 10% and 20% of the
people surveyed played tennis.
Please give your reasons for selecting the answer that you did
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Hospital Problem
A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger
hospital about 45 babies are born each day, and in the smaller
hospital about 15 babies are bom each day. As you know, about
50% of all babies are boys. The exact percentage of baby boys,
however, varies from day to day. Sometimes it maybe higher than
50%, sometimes lower.
For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days on
which more than 60% of the babies bom were boys.
Which of the following would you expect to be tme?
(1) The number of days on which more than 60% of the
babies bom were boys was greater for the smaller hospital than
for the larger hospital.
(2) The number of days on which more than 60% of the
babies bom were boys was greater for the larger hospital than for
the smaller hospital.
(3) There is no reason to expect that the number of days on
which more than 60% of the babies bom were boys should be
greater in one hospital than in the other.
Please write down your reasons for selecting the answer that you
did.
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Tail version prohlems
Geology Problem
In a particular geology course, students must frequently
determine the weight of rock samples. To develop the needed
skills, one instructor has her students practice weighing an object
many times on the same scale. The object, a metal disk is known
to weigh exactly 1000 grams. Although the scale is not completely
accurate, it is equally likely to read high as it is to read low.
However, it is never off from the actual weight by more than 25
grams.
After a lot of practice, each student in one of her classes
(section 1) weighed the disk 20 times and then computed the
average of the 20 weighings. In the other class (section 2), after a
lot of practice, each student weighed the disk 5 times and then
computed the average of the 5 weighings.
Which would you expect to be true? (Circle One)
(1) The percentage of students who obtained an average weight of
more than 1010 grams was larger in section 1 than in section 2.
(2) The percentage of students who obtained an average weight of
more than 1010 grams was larger in section 2 than in section 1.
(3) There is no reason to expect that the percentage of students
who obtained an average weight of more than 1010 grams was
larger for one section than the other.
Please write down the reasons that you selected the answer you
did.
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Women's Heights Problem
At a small women's liberal arts college the students are
required to have a physical examination each year during the first
week of the school year. Physicals are offered at both the main
health services center and at a small clinic that is part of the
recreation center. Each day during that first week of the semester
50 women go the main health clinic for the physicals and 10
women go to the smaller clinic.
Part of the physical examination includes taking the women's
heights and weights. The national average height for college age
women is 5'4". At the end of every day a nurse at each clinic
records the heights of the women that visited the health clinic that
day and calculates the average.
Which of the following would you expect to be true?
(1) The number of days on which the average height was less than
5'!" is greater for the small clinic than for the large clinic.
(2) The number of days on which the average height was less than
5'!" is greater for the large clinic than for the small clinic.
(3) There is no reason to expect the number of days on which the
average height was less than 5'1" to be greater for one clinic than
for the other.
Please write down the reasons that you selected the answer you
did.
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Lures
Pollution Problem
It IS well known in the auto industry that the amount of
pollution produced by new cars varies slightly from car to car
because of slight differences in the machining of parts and in
assembhng. A certain amount of variation is accepted and the
plant officials do not worry unless a sizable number of cars exceed
a maximum pollution threshold.
A certain plant maintains two assembly lines, on that
produces 25 cars a day and one that produces 100. Both lines use
the same parts and the workmen on both hues have equivalem
training.
Last week, each car produced in the plant was tested. It was
found that about 8% (about 2 per day) of the cars produced on the
small line exceeded the pollution threshold. Without any further
information, what would you expect the percentage of cars on the
large assembly line that exceeded the pollution standards to be?
(1) Greater than 8%
.
(2) Less than 8%.
(3) I have no reason to think it should be greater than or
less than 8%.
Please write down your reasons for selecting the answer that you
did.
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Treasury Department Problem
The Treasury Department monitors people's incomes by
takmg random samples from a large set of data on incomes
provided by the Internal Revenue Service. Tom took one random
sample of 25 incomes from these data and George took a random
sample of 200 incomes from the same set of income data. Each
calculated the percent of people in his sample who earned over
$50,000.
Which would be true?
(1) The percent of people who earn over $50,000 in the
sample of 200 is likely to be greater than the percent of
people who earn over $50,000 in the sample of 25.
(2) The percent of people who earn over $50,000 in the
sample of 25 is likely to be greater than the percent of people
who earn over $50,000 in the sample of 200.
(3) There is no reason to expect that the percent of people who
earn over $50,000 will be greater in one sample than in the
other.
Please write down your reasons for selecting the answer you did.
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Fish Hatchery Problem
The manager of a fish hatchery monitors data about the length
and the weight of trout that are raised in the hatchery tanks This
mformation is important because it has been found that if the
trout are too small when they are released into rivers and lakes
the survival rate will be low. Since There are thousands of trout m
the tanks, the data are obtained by taking random samples of the
trout m each tank. From past data, they know the average weight
of trout at a certain age is one pound. On a given day, two
employees each take a random sample of trout at that age to
measure. However, one takes a sample of 10 and the other takes a
sample of 50. They weigh each trout in the sample and compute
the percent of trout that are less than 3/4 of a pound.
Which would be true?
(1) The percent of trout less than 3/4 of a pound should be
greater in the small sample than in the large sample.
(2) The percent of trout less than 3/4 of a pound should be
greater in the large sample than in the small sample.
(3) There is no reason to expect that the percent of trout less than
3/4 of a pound would be greater in one sample than in the other.
Please write down your reasons for selecting the answer that you
did.
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Personality Scale Problem
One of the instruments used for answering personality
development is the Inventory of Psychosocial Growth (IPG) The
IPG consists of 80 items, each of which is thought to correspond to
one aspect of maturity. Overall scores on the IPG can range from 0
to 80 and it has been found over the years that the average score
for college students is 53. Last year at UMass the IPG was
administered to two samples of randomly selected undergraduates
One sample included 30 studems, the other included 200 students.
It was found that about 13% of the students in the small
sample received scores greater than 70. Without any further
information, what would you expect the percemage of students
from the larger sample that scored over 70 to be?
(1) Less than 13%
(2) Greater than 13%
(3) I have no reason to think that it should be less than or
greater than 13%.
Please write down your reasons for selecting the answer that you
did.
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Fong et al (1986^ fake ^\^rrr.c
Brewery Problem
A brewery buys nearly all of its reusable glass bottles from a
local glass manufacturer. One summer, however, the local
company is unable to deliver enough bottles, and the brewery
orders a shipment from a large glass manufacturer that distributes
its products nationwide. On the first day that these new bottles
are used, however, the bottle-filling machinery has to be stopped
four times because of jamming, and as a resuh, production for the
day is unusually low. (Ordinarily the brewery does not experience
more than one jamming stoppage per day and frequently there are
none at all.) The foreman is worried about the new bottles. He
decides to test the new bottles produced by the national
manufacturer carefully. He randomly selects 300 cases of these
new bottles and instructs the bottle-filler operators to record
carefully each jamming incident. Meanwhile, company mechanics
carefully lubricate and check adjustments on the bottle-filling
machinery. When they are finished, the bottle-filling machinery is
running more smoothly than it has in years. During the next 2
days, the 300 cases of new bottles are fed to the machine. There
are only two jamming incidents, one each day. The foreman
concludes that there is in fact little or no real disadvantage of the
new bottles with respect to jamming of the bottle-filling machine.
What do you think about the foreman's reasoning? Give
reasons for your answers.
9 1
Auditor Problem
An auditor for the Internal Revenue Service wants to study
the nature of arithmetic errors on income tax returns. She selects
4000 Social Security numbers by using random digits generated by
an Electronic Mastermind" calculator. And for each selected social
security number she checks the 1988 Federal Income Tax return
thoroughly for arithmetic errors. She finds errors on a large
percentage of the tax returns, often 2 to 6 errors on a single tax
return. Tabulating the effect of each error separately, she finds
that there are virtually the same number of errors in favor of the
taxpayer as in favor of the government. Her boss objects
vigorously to her assertions, saying that it is fairly obvious that
people will notice and correct errors in favor of the government,
but will overlook errors in their own favor. Even if her figures are
correct, he says, looking at a lot more returns will bear out his
point. "
Comment on the auditor's reasoning and her boss's contrary stand.
Which do you think is correct? Please give reasons for your
answers.
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APPENDIX C
THREE POINT CODING SYSTEM
Due to the fact that the Pong et al. (1986) materials we were given
describe their coding system as consisting of a four point scale,
rather than the three point scale they report in their journal
article, and the fact that the problems for the Pong and Nisbett
(1991) study were somewhat different from the problems in the
present study, the three point coding in the present study
attempted to replicate what I thought would be as close as possible
to how Pong and Nisbett would have coded the answers to the
problems in the present study, based on what they have
previously reported as their coding scheme. A description of the
coding scheme used in the present study is listed below.
(1) A one was given for an answer which was entirely
deterministic and contained nothing probabilistic whatsoever.
Answers in which it was extremely difficult to understand what
the subject meant were also given this score.
(2) A two was given for an answer in which there was some
mention of a probabilistic principle, but the intention in
mentioning it was unclear. Also answers that were a mix of
probabilistic and deterministic reasoning, but seemed to rely on
the deterministic were given a two. Answers in which the subject
inappropriately used a probabilistic rationale were also given a
score of two.
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(3) A score of three was given ,o answers in which a clear or
fairly clear probabilistic principle was appropriately used in an
answer to the problem.
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APPENDIX D
RATIONALES CODING SYSTEM
)• No regard for .sample si7f^
1 Any sample is as good as any other
a) because they are both from the same population.
2 As^long as samples are random, nothing else about the sample
Like sample size, etc.
lljr .'^""'"^ P'''""'' ^^^^^g^^' numbers,sample size doesn't matter.
a)because they are both from the same population.
ii
—
Bigger is somehow hPttar
4 Bigger samples give bigger percents.
Because it is a bigger sample you will get a bigger percent.
5 Bigger samples give greater chances for getting anything
Because it is a bigger sample you have a greater chance of
getting...
6 Because it's bigger
Just this phrase, because is bigger than...
III. No regard for data
7 The given data is not important here.
An explanation that mentions factors other than the data or
numbers given (a non statistical answer) as being the causal
reason. In FA, no sample mentioned.
8 It's just luck
The outcome is due to luck, chance, coincidence. It's random,
who knows?
9 You can't predict anything,
a) because they are from the same population, or the same
factors are at work, etc.
b) because variability is involved.
c) because there is not enough information given.
10 You can't make predictions unless you know about the whole
population.
IV. Small samples are inadequate
11 You can't conclude much from a small sample.
12 mit\r^l7:^Z^^^ '^^^"'^ ^^^-^ statement)
results ^ ^""^ ""^'^ ^^"^y inaccurate
Sman ^samples can lead to extreme, strange, maccurate, etc.
13 With a small sample extreme values may occur w/o othervalues to balance them out.
This explanation is a little bit beyond #12, it indicates some
understanding of why #12 is true.
maica
V. Big samples arp
14 Big samples are representative of the population
Simply this sort of statement, no mention of superiority oflarge samples, often applies in FA or lures, i.e. Because of
the sample, I believe, etc.
15 With large samples extreme values tend to be balanced outthus there is less chance for extreme avg.s, etc.
Understanding beyond 18, some explanation for why 18
and/or 19 are true. The other end of number 13.
VL—Some comparison between samplpg
16 Big samples are better than small samples.
This very simple statement, the kind you want to be able to
read into, but it doesn't say enough to be able to really.
17 Big samples are more accurate or representative than small
samples.
a) Frequently just a regurgitation of something they have
been told or have read, doesn't really say what it means to
be more accurate, however it does say more than 17.
b) Something more than "bigger is more accurate." Some
explanation as to what it means to be more accurate, i.e.,
"the bigger one is more like the population, more
representative of the true values, etc."
18 You can make better conclusions and predictions about a pop.
from a big sample than from a small one.
Indicates some understanding of what one can do with a
more accurate sample.
19 The %s or numbers for the samples may be different, but no
way to know which way.
Frequent normative response for lures or FAs, indication that
there is not enough information available to predict which
sample is going to have bigger or smaller percentage, etc.
96
20 Big samples have less deviation/variability from the average
etc., than small samples. ^ '
Also vice versa: Small samples deviate more from the
average., etc.
VII. Other
21 an idiosyncratic answer:
something that can somehow been understood, whether
normative or incorrect, but is an atypical answer
22 unclassifiable
an answer that really says nothing. It makes no sense or is
merely a repetition of the question, etc.
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